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THE COLLISION OF CHURCH AND STATE:
A PRIMER TO BETH DIN
ARBITRATION AND THE NEW
YORK SECULAR COURTS
Ginnine Fried *
When the United States of America was founded, the concept of
the complete separation between Church and State was revolution-
ary and embedded deep within the foundation of this country.' In
the twenty-first century, the American legal system embraced a dif-
ferent change: utilizing alternative dispute resolution methods such
as arbitration, as an alternative to litigating in court.2 This Coin
ment discusses the dilemmas that arise when New York courts are
asked to enforce arbitration decisions promulgated by a religious
arbitration panel called a beth din,3 which operates primarily under
Jewish law.
J.D. expected, Fordham University School of Law, 2004. B.A., Business Cotf-
munications, Baruch College. I dedicate this note to my husband Adam, whose lov-
ing support has helped develop my love of law into a career.
1. The framers' philosophical vision of the separation of Church and State, codi-
fied in the First Amendment to the Constitution, was inspired by the Enlighten-
ment-a period of radical ideas. Daniel L. Dreisbach & John D. Whaley, What the
Wall Separates: A Debate on Thomas Jefferson's "Wall of Separation" Metaphor
[A]greement, In the Abstract, That the First Amendment was Designed to Erect a "Wall
of Separation Between Church and State," Does Not Preclude a Clash of Vows as to
What the Wall Separates, 16 CoNsT. COMMENTARY 627, 647 (1999).
President [Thomas] Jefferson used the celebrated "wall of separation" meta-
phor to define the First Amendment religious clauses. Jefferson wrote... I
contemplate with sovereign reverence that act of the whole American peo-
ple which declared that their legislature should "make no law respecting an
establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof," thus
building a wall of separation between Church & State.
Id. at 627-28.
2. Frank D. Emerson, History of American Arbitration Practice and Law, 19
CLEV. ST. L. REV. 155 (1970). New York State courts did not enforce arbitration
agreements at all until 1920. N.Y. C.P.LR. § 7501.01 (McKinney 2003). With the ad-
aptation of the Arbitration Law to the Consolidated Laws in 1920, however, New
York began to recognize the enforceability of arbitration agreements. Id.
3. Also referred to as beis din and beit din, beth din is a rabbinical court or tribu-
nal which means "house of law" in Hebrew. Jodi M. Solovy, Civil Enforcement of
Jewish Marriage and Divorce: Constitutional Accommodation of a Religious Mandate,
45 DEPAUL L. REV. 493, 500 n.54 (1996).
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For over four thousand years, Jews have been adjudicating dis-
putes in their own court system in accordance with halacha4 (Jew-
ish law) and composed of batei din.5 This practice endured, and the
beth din largely mirrors the structure of an arbitration panel. One
heralded benefit of arbitration is that an arbitrator can be selected
based upon his specialized knowledge in a subject area, and can
accordingly make an educated determination of the dispute.6 In
beth din proceedings, the specialized knowledge possessed by the
arbitrator is knowledge of halacha.7 Beth din decisions could be-
come legally binding and enforceable by the secular courts if the
parties were asked to sign an arbitration agreement enabling the
beth din to decide their dispute.8
The interaction between the secular courts and beth din arbitra-
tion has created a distinct body of case law, where the secular
courts have been called upon to either enforce or vacate decisions
made pursuant to religious legal principles. These situations test
the ability of the secular courts to walk the uncertain line separat-
ing Church and State when ruling on the enforceability of decisions
made by a religious tribunal.
Part I of this Comment will examine the reasons why an inde-
pendent Jewish religious court system is required and utilized de-
spite the existence of a fair and equitable secular court system.
This section will describe the Jewish legal principles involved, and
how they impact both Jewish litigants and lawyers.
Part II will describe the mechanics of transforming a religious
tribunal into a legally binding arbitration panel in New York State.
This Comment will focus on courts in New York, the state with the
4. Halacha is the word "law" in Hebrew, literally "the way on which one goes."
Chad Baruch & Karsten Lokken, Research of Jewish Law Issues: A Basic Guide and
Bibliography for Students and Practitioners, 77 U. DET. MERCY L. REV. 303, 306
(2000). Halacha is based on the written law, known as the Bible or Old Testament,
and the oral law, explanations of the written law as expounded by rabbinical authori-
ties in the Mishnah and Talmud. Id. This comment will focus on the orthodox inter-
pretation of Jewish law, as orthodox Jews most commonly utilize the batei din to
adjudicate disputes.
5. The plural form of beth din is batei din.
6. ABRAHAM P. ORDOVER, ALTERNATIVES TO LITIGATION 124-25 (1st ed. 1993).
7. CNSNews.com, Jewish Court Excommunicates Lieberman, Oct. 24, 2000, at
http://www.newsmax.com/articles/?a=2000/10/23/165511.txt (last visited Apr. 8, 2004).
"Decisions from a beth din are not based on secular law, but rather the interpretation
of Jewish teachings." Id.
8. See, e.g., Elmora Hebrew Ctr. v. Fishman, Inc., 570 A.2d 1297, 1299 (N.J.
Super. Ct. 1990).
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largest orthodox Jewish population in the United States and, con-
sequently, the state with the majority of existing case law.9
Part III will discuss the limited grounds upon which a beth din
award may be vacated through statutory requirements and recent
developments in the case law. This Comment will demonstrate the
courts' reluctance to treat a beth din as a standard arbitration panel
because of the possibility of encroaching on the Free Exercise
Clause of the Constitution.10 Lastly, this Comment will identify ar-
eas in which the courts have failed to vacate awards, seemingly de-
serving of vacature, due to a fundamental lack of understanding of
Jewish mores and customs. This failure to vacate thereby demon-
strates the need for further reform in this area of law.
I. HISTORICAL, HALACHIC, AND PRAGMATIC REASONS FOR
THE BETH DIN
Beginning with a central authority of Jews established by the Ro-
man conquerors to control the population after the fall of Judea in
70 C.E., most secular governments under which Jews lived
throughout the Diaspora encouraged them to establish some form
of self-government to further their own aims, such as tax collec-
tion.11 Even when there was a general self-government policy for
ethnic groups, particularly in Europe, Jews were unique in being
allowed their own system of courts wherever they organized com-
munity life.12
The Jewish court system initially developed due to the Talmudic
ban on Jews voluntarily presenting their cases to courts governed
by idolatrous peoples, courts of Akkum. 13 This prohibition was ex-
9. A study by the United Jewish Communities placed the population of the
Greater New York City Area at 1.4 million people, more than any other Jewish com-
munity studied this decade. North American Jewish Data Bank, Local Jewish Com-
munity Studies: New York (2002), at http://www.jewishdatabank.org/index.cfm?page=
102. For a discussion of beth din arbitration in California, another state with a large
orthodox Jewish population, see Randy Linda Sturman, House of Judgment: Alternate
Dispute Resolution in the Orthodox Jewish Community, 36 CAL. W. L. REV. 417
(2000).
10. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
11. ISRAEL GOLDSTEIN, JEWISH JUSTICE AND CONCILIATION: HISTORY OF THE
JEWISH CONCILIATION BOARD OF AMERICA, 1930-1968, AND A REVIEW OF JEWISH
JUDICIAL AUTONOMY 3 (1983).
12. Id.
13. See TALMUD BAVLI, Tractate Gittin 88b; see also SHULCHAN ARUCH, Hoshen
Mishpat 26:1 (restating MAIMONEDES, MISHNAH TORAH, Tactate Sanhedrin 25:7).
The concept of religious self-adjudication is not unique to Judaism. GOLDSTEIN,
supra note 11, at 4. The early Christians similarly did not permit the use of the Ro-
man courts. Id. Some contemporary Christian teachings strongly discourage taking
2004] 635
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tended to all secular courts because the phrase "courts of Akkum"
was interpreted to include the Muslim courts, which were not pre-
sided over by idolatrous peoples. 14
The Talmud in Gittin states:
R. Tarfon used to say: In any place where you find gentile
courts, even though their law is the same as the Israelite law,
you must not resort to them since it says, 'These are the judg-
ments which thou shalt set before them.' (Ex. 21:1) this is to say,
'before them' and not before gentiles. 15
Thus, while the secular courts of the United States government
may be just and proper, interpretation of the Talmud suggests that
an obligation to utilize a Jewish forum to adjudicate disputes still
exists.
Additional halachic reasons exist for the ban in contemporary
Jewish law. A Jew who accuses another Jew in a secular court vio-
lates the supreme prohibition of chillul Hashem, which is the dese-
cration of God's name.16 The very mission of the Jewish people is
to be or lagoyim, "a light unto the nations," and to serve as a model
of those who are governed by God's divine law. 17 Bringing a dis-
pute between Jews out of the Jewish community and into the eye of
the general public, unnecessarily publicizes the wrongdoing. This
results in a degradation of the law by exposing a Jew in violation of
God's divine laws. After all, if an observant Jew acts wrongfully,
disputes to a secular court, as well. See R. Seth Shippee, "Blessed Are the Peacemak-
ers": Faith-Based Approaches to Dispute Resolution, 9 ILSA J. INT'L & COMP. L. 237,
242 (2002).
14. For a thorough discussion of this interpretation, see Rabbi Simcha Kraus, Liti-
gation in Secular Courts, available at http://www.jlaw.com/Articles/litiga-
tion-in secularcou rtsl.html (last visited Apr. 9, 2004).
15. Id. (translating TALMUD BAVLI, supra note 13). The Talmud includes an alter-
nate explanation of this Biblical sentence, with "them" meaning "laymen" as opposed
to "gentiles." This may explain the why there is disagreement in orthodox law as to
the strength of the prohibition on utilizing the secular courts. However, "[t]he hala-
cha against going to Arkhaoth [secular courts] is clear cut." Id.
16. GOLDSTEIN, supra note 11, at 4 (referring to chillul Hashem, where a Jew re-
fers to another Jew in Gentile court as having committed the "major sin of
denunciation").
17. The concept of or lagoyim is derived from the Book of Isaiah, which echoes
statements in the Torah of the Jewish people's mandate to serve as an example to the
nations of the world. The Torah states, "and you shall be to me a kingdom of priests,
and a holy nation." Exodus 19:6. The prophet Isaiah expounded upon this duty: "I
the Lord have called you in righteousness, and will hold your hand, and will keep you,
and give you for a covenant of the people, for a light unto the nations." Isaiah 42:6; "I
will also give you for a light unto the nations, that my salvation may be to the end of
the earth." Isaiah 49:6; "[ajnd the nations shall come unto your light, and kings to the
brightness of your rising." Isaiah 60:3.
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sinfully, and shamefully despite being a practicing Jew, an onlooker
might think that the laws of Judaism have little worth since follow-
ing the laws does not seem to make one a better person. By exten-
sion, this brings shame upon the Jewish community at large.
Secondly, choosing a secular court despite the availability of a
Jewish court undermines the authority of Jewish law and the
rabbinical courts,18 and what follows is the inference that the beth
din lacks either the capability or sophistication to adjudicate an is-
sue according to halacha.19 The great rabbinical authority
Maimonedes captured this sentiment when he wrote that a Jew
who voluntarily brings his case to secular court instead of utilizing
the beth din has behaved "as if he had raised his hand against the
Torah."20 Today, modern Jewish authorities still hold that "[a] cen-
tral principle of halacha is that disputes between Jews should be
adjudicated in duly-constituted rabbinical courts."21
There are some exceptions to the general rule banning Jews from
the secular courts. It is important to note that the Talmudic ban
only prohibits a Jew from being the first to resort to the secular
courts, and does not prohibit a Jewish defendant from appearing in
a secular court when summoned.22 To the contrary, the overarch-
ing rule of dina de'malchutah dina would apply in that situation,
meaning, "the law of the land is the law."2 3 Therefore, Jews are
halachicly obligated to obey a summons to appear in a secular
court regardless of whether a Jew or a non-Jew initiated the suit,
because that is the law of the governmental authority under which
they reside.24 There is also another exception when a defendant
refuses to voluntarily submit to the jurisdiction of the beth din to
decide a dispute, wherein the plaintiff must first apply to the beth
din for a heter (exemption) from the ban, and thereafter may file
his case in secular court with the permission of the beth din.2"
.18. GOLDSTEIN, supra note 11, at 4.
19. See id.
20. Id. (quoting SHULCAN ARUCH, supra note 13, at 26(a)). "Torah" is the He-
brew word for the five books of Moses, the foundation of the practice of Judaism.
21. Dov Bressler, Arbitration and the Courts in Jewish Law, 9 J. HALACHA & CON-
TEMP. Soc'y 105, 109 (1985).
22. TALMUD BAVLI, Bava Kama 92b; see also SHULCHAN ARUCH, supra note 13.
23. E.g., TALMUD BAVLI, Bava Kama 113; Gittin 10.
24. See Sanford Levinson, Colloquy: Identifying the Jewish Lawyer: Reflections on
the Construction of Professional Identity, 14 -CARDOZO L. REV. 1577, 1608 (1993).
Secular law trumps Jewish law in dinei mamonot, civil commercial law. Jewish law
would trump secular law in regard to dinei issurim, which are religious and ritual
observances. Id.
25. RAMBAM, Hilchos Sanhedrin 26:7.
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Incidentally, the ban on being the first to resort to a secular court
also applies to a Jewish lawyer representing a Jewish plaintiff.2 6
This arises due to the Biblical prohibition of lifnei iver lo titein
machshoL 27 This law has been interpreted to mean that a Jew can-
not aid in the commission of a violation of the law.28 "[T]here are
a number of conditions that allow exceptions to be made, the most
important of which is the likelihood that the potential sinner will in
fact be able to gain his object even without the help of the particu-
lar abettor. ' 29 The Biblical commandment of hochiach tochiach et
amitecha (the duty to rebuke a Jew in the commission of a wrong-
doing) arises, however.3 ° Therefore, at the very least, a Jewish
plaintiff's lawyer has the religious duty to advise a Jewish client to
avail himself of the beth din prior to filing suit in the secular courts.
The violation of the Talmudic ban on utilizing the secular courts
merited cherem (excommunication), one of the most severe pun-
ishments the beth din could impose.3 ' Unlike in Christianity, when
a Jew is excommunicated, he does not lose his status as a Jew. 32
Rather, this decree calls for the expulsion of the individual from
the religious and social life of the community.3 3 This can include,
withholding burial rites, prohibiting synagogue admittance, and
preventing patronizing his livelihood or business. 34 One can imag-
ine the harshness of this penalty where Jews lived separate from
the rest of society. Enforcement of this ban, however, has relaxed
through the centuries, first with the removal of the ban on a plain-
tiff upon consent of the other party,35 then with inadequate en-
forcement of the ban overall.36 This is in no small part due to the
fact that a religious court that enforces its bans through social pres-
sure alone is ineffective when the individual lives in an open soci-
26. Levinson, supra note 24, at 1603.
27. Translated in English as, "Before a blind man do not place a stumbling block."
Leviticus 19:14.
28. Levinson, supra note 24, at 1605.
29. Id. (quoting Michael J. Broyde, On the Practice of Law According to Halacha,
20 J. HALACHA & CONTEMP. Soc'y 5, 12 (1990)).
30. Leviticus 19:17.
31. GOLDSTEIN, supra note 11, at 4. Cherem, also spelled Herein, might include
being locked out of the synagogue, the prohibition from patronizing one's business,
and the inability to marry one's children within the community. Id.
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. Id. at 4-5.
36. Id.
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ety like the United States. 37 It is clear today that many Jews will
readily file suit against another Jew without first seeking permis-
sion of a beit din, due to lax enforcement of the ban and the view
that the laws of the United States are equitable and fair. 38 Despite
this fact, however, the batei din are still frequently utilized because
the Talmudic ban is only one reason why the courts exist today.3 9
Aside from the halachic requirement for a beth din, there are
additional reasons the Beth Din has been, and continues to be, an
attractive forum to settle disputes between Jewish litigants. In
some instances, there is simply a general distrust of the secular
court system.40 Historically, this feeling stems from a fear of anti-
Semitism.4 ' Today, there is a preference for a beth din when a dis-
pute involves underlying Jewish concepts, and the disputants doubt
whether a non-Jewish adjudicator could sufficiently comprehend
those foreign concepts and properly rule on the dispute.4 2 This
echoes one of the positive aspects of arbitration in general, the
37. A good example of the ineffectiveness of a modern day cherem is that of Sena-
tor Joseph Lieberman, who was excommunicated by a Brooklyn beth din comprised
of three rabbis while he was a Vice-Presidential candidate. Mark Oppenheimer,
'Shunning' Won't Hurt Lieberman; A New York Jewish Religious Court's Decree
Against Vice Presidential Candidate Joseph Lieberman Carries Little Weight, Some
Rabbis Say, HARTFORD COURANT, Nov. 2, 2000, at A18. The decree of cherem was
due to his public support of partial-birth abortion, homosexuality, and women in the
military, all considered to be against halacha. Id. The cherem had no practical effect
on Lieberman. Id. It should be noted that there are indeed several insulated ortho-
dox Jewish communities that live within their own particular sect where the threat of
cherem, or the related siruv, would be a potent threat for beth din enforcement today.
See text accompanying infra notes 138-150.
38. Michelle Greenberg-Kobrin, Civil Enforceability of Religious Prenuptial
Agreements, 32 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 359, 367-68 n.47-50 (1999).
39. See text accompanying infra notes 41-52, for a discussion of other reasons for
the continued utilization of the beth din.
40. See GOLDSTEIN, supra note 11, at 4.
41. Id.
42. One example would be in a dispute involving a heter iska, which is a means for
halachically allowing Jews to charge each other interest for a loan. Hetter Isske or
heter iska was a device developed in the twelfth to fourteenth centuries to overcome
the Biblical prohibition against one Jew charging interest to another. Leviticus 25:36-
8; see also Deuteronomy 23:19-20. It was patterned upon an agreement of partnership
or joint venture, wherein the "lender" would supply the money and the "borrower" or
working partner had complete freedom to use the capital, and he guaranteed the in-
vestment against loss. He also guaranteed a minimum return. Heimbinder v.
Berkovitz, 670 N.Y.S.2d 301, 306 (Sup. Ct. 1998) (quoting Leibovici v. Rawicki, 290
N.Y.S.2d 997, 1000 (Civ. Ct. 1968)). This is an example of the factual complexities a
litigant in a secular court may face when dealing with Jewish law, when the heter iska's
purpose would be self-evident in the beth din. See id.
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ability to choose an arbitrator with expertise in a certain field to
decide a case.43
A beth din is also an attractive option for Yiddish or Hebrew-
speaking litigants who would like to participate in the proceeding,
because it can be conducted in their native language. 4 Conducting
the proceeding in their native tongue may make the parties feel
more comfortable and facilitates their participation and under-
standing of the procedure.
Yet another reason the beth din has retained its popularity is be-
cause as an alternate dispute resolution method, it typically a
quicker and more cost-effective means to settling a dispute than
litigation.45 There are even historically recorded instances of two
non-Jewish parties that utilized the beth din for this very reason. 6
Recently, a woman in need of temporary support and maintenance
shortly after commencing divorce proceedings was advised to sub-
mit her dispute to a beth din because it would be faster than the
"many weeks" a pendente lite application would take.47
Lastly, a beth din must always play a major role in the area of
Jewish divorce.48 According to Jewish law, Jewish courts have ex-
clusive jurisdiction in the divorce process.49 One must obtain a re-
ligious divorce properly executed with the aid of a rabbinical court
in order to terminate a Jewish marriage, a civil divorce alone does
nothing to change the couple's marital status. 50 Due to this neces-
sary interaction with the beth din, the parties are often encouraged
43. ORDOVER, supra note 6, at 124-25.
44. See generally James Yaffe, So Sue Me! The Story of a Community Court (1972)
(discussing the procedures used by the Beth Din in American society).
45. ORDOVER, supra note 6, at 143, 145-46.
46. GOLDSTEIN, supra note 11, at 5.
47. Stein v Stein, 707 N.Y.S.2d 754, 757 (Sup. Ct. 1999).
48. "In order for the get to be universally recognized within the Jewish world, it is
essential that the get procedures be effected under the auspices of an orthodox beth
din (Court of Jewish religious law)." Agunot Campaign, Why You Need a Get, at
http://www.agunot-campaign.org.uk/get.htm (last visited Apr. 9, 2004).
49. Id. "It is well known that she [a woman without a valid get] clearly cannot re-
marry in an orthodox synagogue, even if she has been through a civil divorce because,
according to halacha, she remains married until she receives a get. If she decides to
undertake a civil re-marriage, then this is held to be invalid under halacha." Id.
50. Law based on Deuteronomy 24:1, describes the process whereby a man can
divorce his wife by giving her a bill of divorce. Since the initial Jewish marriage cere-
mony established a contract between the parties, only a Jewish court can terminate
that contract with a properly executed get, a bill of Jewish divorce. Rabbi Shlomo
Riskin, Shabbat Shalom: Parshat Ki Tetze Deuteronomy 21:10-25:19, at http://
www.ohrtorahst one.org.il/parsha/5760/kiteze60.htm (last visited Apr. 9, 2004). The
get contract is devoid of any blessings, references to the divine, or apportionment of
blame; it is simply a termination contract. Id; see also Shippee, supra note 13, at 253.
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and even pressured to submit all disputes related to the divorce to
the beth din, including child custody, visitation, maintenance, and
equitable distribution.5'
Therefore, the institution of the beth din, so firmly rooted in the
history of the Jewish people, continues to play an active role in the
adjudication of disputes.
II. THE MECHANICS OF ENDOWING A BETH DIN WITH
LEGAL AUTHORITY
A. Establishing the Beth Din as an Arbitration Panel
A beth din is generally composed of three rabbis who sit as
judges of Jewish law. 2 The Beth Din of America53 has some flexi-
bility in the structure of the beth din; it usually utilizes a single
rabbi to decide a dispute where less than $10,000 is in contro-
versy.54 There is an option for a panel of three men, one of which
must be a rabbi, when the amount in controversy is over $10,000.55
While batei din issue their own summonses to appear (hazmanos),
and render their own decisions, without a valid arbitration agree-
ment between the parties, "the actions of the Beth Din or other
religious tribunal need not be given recognition in the courts of
New York State. '' 56 Only a beth din operating under the jurisdic-
tion of New York's arbitration statute, Civil Practice Law and
Rules Article 75, can produce legally enforceable decisions that
can be confirmed and enforced by a New York Court.57
51. See Susan Metzger Weiss, Sign at Your Own Risk: The "RCA " Prenuptial May
Prejudice the Fairness of your Divorce Proceeding, 6 CARDOZO WOMEN'S L. J. 49, 70
(1999) (discussing how the beth din includes in its recommended prenuptial agree-
ments clauses that grant jurisdiction over the division of marital property to a beth
din).
52. See BERNARD J. MEISLIN, JEWISH LAW IN AMERICAN TRIBUNALS 123 (1976).
Three Jewish men who are familiar with the law, however, may also sit as a beth din
according to halacha. See Shippee, supra note 13, at 250 n.118 (citing MENACHEM
ELON, THE PRINCIPLES OF JEWISH LAW 570 (1997)).
53. "The Beth Din [of America] was founded by and is affiliated with the
Rabbinical Council of America (RCA) and is sponsored by the Union of Orthodox
Jewish Congregations of America." Beth Din of America, Our Mission, Background
& Affiliations, Principals (1999), at http://www.bethdin.org/mission.htm (last visited
Apr. 9, 2004).
54. Beth Din of America, Recent Developments at the Beth Din of America (June
2002), at http://www.bethdin.org/062502.htm (last visited Apr. 9, 2004) [hereinafter
Recent Developments].
55. Id.
56. See Moskowitz v. Moskowitz, N.Y. L.J., June 10, 1997, at 25.
57. See, e.g., Kozlowski v. Seville Syndicate, Inc., 314 N.Y.S.2d 439 (Sup. Ct. 1970)
(holding that where arbitrator's award was of no force and and effect as to deprive
2004]
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There are two means by which beth din arbitration agreements
can be created. An arbitration agreement may be entered into
prior to the onset of any controversy, 8 such as contract clauses that
bind the parties to submit future disputes regarding that transac-
tion to the beth din.59 The second way a beth din arbitration agree-
ment is established is when the parties agree to arbitrate a current
issue in lieu of litigation, then sign an arbitration agreement.60 In
either event, the agreement must state the parties' decision to sub-
mit to the beth din and "the scope of the Beth Din's Jurisdiction
must be clearly, unequivocally and explicitly expressed in the arbi-
tration agreement. ' 61 Very broad language, however, stating that
the parties agree to "settle the arguments, claims and all disputes
that are between us before the Rabbinical Court," has been held to
fulfill this requirement.62
Once there is a valid arbitration agreement, the secular courts
will not hear a case filed in court prior to a stay of the proceedings
in the arbitration court. 63 The court places the burden on the par-
ties to understand the nature of the arbitration proceedings and its
binding effect, thus ignorance of the law is no excuse. 64 There is an
even heavier burden to vacate an arbitration award, and so, one
must be careful and make an informed decision about whether or
not to sign an agreement to arbitrate.65 In her dissent in Silverman
v. Benmor Coats, Inc., Chief Justice Kaye emphasized the need for
extreme caution in undertaking an arbitration agreement because
petitioner of his antecedent status as stockholder, director, and officer of corporation,
petitioner was entitled to inspect books).
58. ORDOVER, supra note 6, at 139.
59. See Weiss, supra note 51 (regarding clauses in prenuptial agreements that con-
fer jurisdiction on the beth din for matters ancillary to the couple's divorce).
60. See Meisels v. Uhr, 593 N.E.2d 1359, 1360-61 (N.Y. 1992) (involving a business
dispute where parties agreed in writing to submit the dispute to a beth din arbitration
panel).
61. Waldron v. Goddess, 461 N.E.2d 273, 275 (N.Y. 1984); see also N.Y. C.P.L.R.
§ 7501 (McKinney 2002). One instance where the agreement to submit to beth din
arbitration was found to be too vague was when a contract referred all disputes to be
resolved "in accordance with the 'regulations of Speyer, Worms, and Mainz.'" Sieger
v. Sieger, 747 N.Y.S.2d 102, 103 (App. Div. 2002).
62. Lieberman v. Lieberman, 566 N.Y.S.2d 490, 492 (Sup. Ct. 1991).
63. See Meisels, 593 N.E.2d at 1359. The New York court must first examine
threshold issues to determine whether it can hear the case at all, "whether a valid
arbitration agreement has been made by the parties, and whether the agreement has
been complied with." Id.
64. Id. at 1359.
65. N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 7511(b)(1) (McKinney 2003).
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''once arbitration has been designated there is little hope of later
containing it by way of judicial supervision. '"66
It is interesting to note a wrinkle in the necessity of a valid arbi-
tration agreement between the parties, in order for the beth din to
properly retain jurisdiction in disputes between synagogues and
their members. If a synagogue's charter states that all disputes in-
volving the synagogue must be adjudicated by a beth din, a valid
signature of the individual is not necessary, because the passing of
the rule by the Board of Trustees suffices to bind every member of
the congregation. 67 Just as in arbitration agreements between indi-
viduals, however, the charter or constitution of the corporation
must specifically confer jurisdiction upon the beth din.68 For exam-
ple, a vague obligation to "follow halacha in all dealings by and
between the group, its members, its rabbi, its officers and directors,
other branches of the Organization and the Organization ' 69 in a
charter will not suffice to bind the parties to beth din arbitration.70
B. Halachic Considerations of Enforcing Beth Din Decisions in
a Secular Court
It might seem contrary to Jewish legal principles to resort to the
secular courts to enforce a beth din decision, as the very reason one
goes to a beth din is to avoid the usage of the secular courts in the
first place.7 1 Utilizing the secular court system to confirm an arbi-
tration award, however, is halachically sound.72 Since the enforc-
ing party properly submitted the dispute first to the beth din,
demonstrating the proper reverence and esteem to the beth din's
authority, "[o]ne does not esteem the ... [secular courts] when
they are second choice."73 Therefore, there is no violation of the
prohibition against undermining rabbinical authority.
In addition, the prohibition of chillul Hashem is not violated.
The legislative intent of conferring jurisdiction to arbitration panels
was to prevent the involvement of the courts in the merits of a
66. 461 N.E.2d 1261, 1270 (N.Y. 1984) (Kaye, J., dissenting).
67. Congregation Derech Amuno v. Blasof, 640 N.Y.S.2d 564, 565 (1996).
68. See Decision of Interest, New York Supreme Court, New York County; IA
PART 59, N.Y. L.J., Sept. 15, 2003, at 22, n.8.
69. Id.
70. See id.
71. See Kraus, supra note 14.
72. See id.
73. Id.
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case.7 4 As such, arbitration awards are not subject to judicial re-
view, with few exceptionsY.7  Therefore, because the facts of the
case are not regurgitated in their entirety for adjudication before a
secular court, there is little risk that the confirmation of a beth din
award will result in a chillul Hashem.
C. Challenges in Conforming a Beth Din to the New York
Arbitration Statute
Conforming a beth din to the rules of an arbitration panel is sim-
ply a matter of making the beth din conform to the secular require-
ments of an arbitration panel.76 There are relatively few structural
rules that must be followed in order to abide by New York arbitra-
tion law.77 Arbitrators are not bound by principles of substantive
law or by rules of evidence, 78 but may do justice as they see fit.79
Thus, the arbitrators in a beth din are free to apply Jewish law ex-
clusively, or to integrate it to varying degrees with secular law.80
In the past, each community had its own beth din and everyone
in the community was aware of what procedures were involved.8'
A significant problem with the beth din today is that many people
are not aware of the procedural safeguards in place under New
York's arbitration statute.82 Civil Practice Law and Rules Article
75 delineates the method by which an arbitration proceeding is
convened, and the procedural safeguards that must be employed.8 3
While a full discussion of the requirements for an arbitration panel
in New York is beyond the scope of this comment, there are some
74. Silverman v. Benmor Coats, Inc., 461 N.E.2d 1261, 1265 (N.Y. 1984).
("C.P.L.R. §7501 mandates that 'the court shall not consider whether the claim with
respect to which arbitration is sought is tenable, or otherwise pass upon the merits of
the dispute.'")
75. There are situations when a court asked to confirm an arbitration award is
required to review the issues de novo. See infra Part IIIA. When a secular court is
asked to vacate an award based on the accusation of fraud or misconduct on the part
of rabbi arbitrators, there would be an issue of chillul Hashem by bringing the integ-
rity of a rabbi into question before a secular court.
76. See N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 7501 (McKinney 2003).
77. See N.Y. C.P.L.R. §§ 7501-10 (McKinney 2003).
78. See ORDOVER, supra note 6, at 144 (explaining that the procedures in arbitra-
tion are designed by the parties as opposed to required rules and procedures).
79. Hecht v. Gertler, 601 N.Y.S.2d 316, 317 (App. Div. 1993).
80. See id.
81. Conference Revolutions Within Communities: The Fifth Annual Domestic Vio-
lence Conference, Issues in Representing Immigrant Victims, 29 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 3,
83 (2001) [hereinafter Conference Revolutions].
82. See id. at 82.
83. Stein v Stein, 707 N.Y.S.2d 754, 759 (Sup. Ct. 1999).
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safeguards in particular that are most often disputed in New York
courts in determining the validity of a beth din arbitration decision.
Civil Practice Law and Rules section 7506(b)8 4 states that the
arbitrator must appoint a time and place for the hearing and notify
the parties in writing personally or by mail no less than eight days
prior to the hearing. 5 This is an important procedural safeguard,
as one party cannot be forced into signing an arbitration agreement
and appearing before the beth din on the same day. 6 This is
doubly significant because the vast majority of batei din will accom-
modate a proceeding on a moment's notice, especially when facili-
tating a Jewish divorce.87 While the beth din may grant the Jewish
divorce on a moment's notice, as that is wholly unrelated to secular
law, the parties cannot settle any ancillary financial issues to the
divorce that are binding that same day if the original arbitration
agreement solely encompassed a divorce proceeding. 8 Due to the
fact that in a Jewish divorce only the male may grant the female a
document of divorce, there is a substantial history of husbands
making additional last minute demands upon the their wives,
threatening withdrawal from the get process.8 9 Such demands have
included custody rights, visitation rights, and money from marital
assets.9° A violation of the required eight-day time delay91 alone is
enough to vacate an arbitration award, without requiring an exami-
nation into the factual details of the dispute.
Each party is also entitled to attorney representation, which can-
not be waived by agreement.92 Litigants in the beth din are not
always aware of this right, and thus, unknowingly waive the added
safeguard of legal representation in the beth din arbitration hear-
ing. 93 The right to counsel in beth din arbitration can be an issue
because "the role of the lawyer, especially defined as a client-ori-
84. N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 7506(b) (Mckinney 2003).
85. N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 7506(b).
86. E.g., id. (noting that where arbitration agreement was signed on the same day
the proceeding commenced, the court refused to confirm the arbitration agreement).
87. E.g., Recent Developments, supra note 54 ("the Beth Din quickly arranged an
emergency Get for a couple where the man was about to make aliyah [to Israel] and
the woman was about to leave for Paris for an extended period of time.").
88. See N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 7506(b).
89. See Kent Greenwalt, Religious and Civil Law: Using Secular Law to Assure
Observance of Practices with Religious Significance, 71 S. CAL. L. REv. 781, 811-12
(1998).
90. See id.
91. N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 7506(b).
92. N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 7506(d); see also Conference Revolutions, supra note 81, at 82-
83.
93. See Conference Revolutions, supra note 81, at 82-83.
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ented advocate, is not a featured (or valued) one within the Jewish
tradition. '" 94 No lawyers existed in the batei din of ancient Israel.
9 5
The lawyer is depicted in halachic sources as one who is pursuing
only his client's causes, not pursuing justice itself, in conflict with
the Biblical commandment "tzedek tzedek tirdof'-meaning jus-
tice, justice thou shalt pursue.96
The Jewish legal system was based on the litigants themselves
appearing directly before the judges and telling the truth, not a
manipulated version of the truth.97 Although Jewish legal proce-
dure since the Middle Ages has allowed lawyers to continue to re-
present clients today,98 this concept is by no means embraced.99
The batei din of today may be discouraging the presence of counsel
by not informing its participants of their right to counsel, or by
their technical compliance with the law that is accompanied by a
generally unfavorable attitude toward the use of counsel. 100 For
example, the Beth Din of America's policy is that a "party that
does not attend the proceedings with an attorney shall be deemed
to have waived his right to counsel for that proceeding. '"10 1 There
is no requirement for the beth din to confirm that the participants
have actually decided to waive their right to counsel at the pro-
ceeding, such as a required document or a statement recited by the
arbitrator prior to the proceeding requiring the participants' con-
sent to waive counsel.10 2 Such a requirement would certainly serve
to inform participants of this vital right and prevent future ques-
tioning the validity of the proceeding.
The problems with compliance with the procedural rules are
counter-intuitive, as one would think the beth din has an incentive
to ensure compliance with all procedural safeguards so that any
decision reached will be confirmed. The collection of beth din va-
catures, however, suggest that these problems are recurrent. One
can merely guess the countless number of people who might have
simply obeyed the decision of the beth din, unknowingly deprived
94. Levinson, supra note 24, at 1596-97.
95. Id. at 1597 (citing MYER GALINSKI, PURSUE JUSTICE: THE ADMINISTRATION
OF JUSTICE IN ANCIENT ISRAEL 190 (1983)).
96. Deuteronomy 48:20.
97. Levinson, supra note 24, at 1596-1600 (providing a full history of halachic ref-
erences to the undesirability of the aid of lawyers in the adjudication process).
98. See Aaron Kirschenbaum, Representation in Litigation in Jewish Law, in 6
DINE ISRAEL XXv-xli (Zeer W. Falk & Aaron Kirschenbaum eds., 1975).
99. Id.
100. See, e.g., Recent Developments, supra note 54, at §12.
101. Id.
102. Id.
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of their rights or unwilling to go through the costly and time-con-
suming procedure of vacating the resulting award. An arbitration
agreement should be required to clearly state that the party is enti-
tled to have an attorney present, and the arbitrator should have
participants verbally acknowledge the waiver of this right before
commencing the arbitration proceeding.
IH. VACATING ARBITRATION AWARDS-NEW YORK CIVIL
PRACTICE LAW AND RULES SECTION 7511
The main difference between litigation and arbitration is that the
latter lacks an appeals process.103 While the finality reached with
the decision can be viewed as a positive aspect of arbitration, the
flip-side of the situation is that whatever decision is reached will
more than likely be confirmed by a secular court. This is because
"[a] court cannot examine the merits of an arbitration award and
substitute its judgment for that of the arbitrator simply because it
believes its interpretation would be the better one. ' 1°4
There are few grounds for vacating arbitration awards, and the
party that seeks to vacate bears the burden of proof that the deci-
sion should be vacated. 10 5 Arbitration agreements may be vacated
on the grounds that the original arbitration agreement was a prod-
uct of duress, if the decision reached is a violation of public pol-
icy,10 6 or a product of fraud, misconduct, or lack of impartiality. 10 7
A. Public Policy Grounds
The threshold question as to whether the beth din may decide a
dispute is whether the matter at hand is arbitrable."0 8 The pre-
sumption is that most disputes are arbitrable, as "[o]ur State has
long sanctioned arbitration as an effective alternative method of
103. William H. Knull, III & Noah D. Rubins, Betting the Farm on International
Arbitration: Is It Time To Offer An Appeal Option?, 11 AM. REV. INT'L ARB. 531
(2000).
104. In re State Corr. Officers v. New York, 726 N.E.2d 462, 465 (N.Y. 1999).
105. E.g., Sultan Mohiuddin v. Khan, 602 N.Y.S.2d 664, 665 (App. Div. 1993)
(quoting Syracuse Cent. Sch. Dist. v N. Syracuse Educ. Ass'n, 379 N.E.2d 1193, 1195-
96 (N.Y. 1978)).
106. See Susquehanna Valley Sch. Dist. v. Susquehanna Valley Teachers' Ass'n, 339
N.E.2d 132 (N.Y. 1975). "Public policy, whether derived from, and whether explicit
or implicit in statute or decisional law, or in neither, may also restrict the freedom to
arbitrate." Id. at 616-17.
107. N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 7511(b)(1)(i) (McKinney 2003).
108. In re Barnes, 731 N.E.2d 134 (N.Y. 2000). "The claim must be lawfully fit for
arbitration, i.e., no public policy, statutory or constitutional restriction places arbitra-
tion off-limits." Id. at 136.
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settling disputes in a nonjudicial forum." 10 9 "The granting of broad
powers to Arbitrators to consider all issues submitted to them is
the very essence of arbitration and is to be sanctioned by the au-
thorities."110 Based on public policy grounds, however, some dis-
putes may not be definitively decided by a beth din.
Some non-arbitrable cases brought before the beth din involve
child custody, visitation, and child support."1 Because Judaism re-
quires a religious divorce wholly separate from a civil divorce in
order to remarry, couples are frequently pressured to arbitrate all
issues arising subsequent to the divorce proceeding through the
same beth din that officiated the religious divorce. 112 One who ini-
tially pursues a religious divorce may be prevented by the religion
from dealing with issues in a secular court, under the threat that
the religious divorce will be revoked. 3 For example, one beth din
arbitration agreement included the following clause:
The Certificate of Jewish Divorce is conditional upon compli-
ance by both parties to the Psak [or decision] of the Bais Din.
Should any party violate the original Psak, or the addendum, or
take action in Civil Court without the permission of the Bais
Din, the validity of the Get will be in question and the Bais Din
reserves [their] right to revoke the Certificate of Jewish
Divorce." 4
Such clauses create fear, specifically in the female party, as she
stands to lose her divorce, and accordingly her ability to ever re-
marry, if she pursues an action in the secular court system.
As a safeguard preventing any arrangement from violating New
York's "in the best interest of the child" standard, disputes over
child custody and visitation are not subject to arbitration and will
109. Lieberman v. Lieberman, 566 N.Y.S.2d 490, 490 (Sup. Ct. 1991).
110. Lehman v. Sage Metal Trading, 503 N.Y.S.2d 804 (App. Div. 1986).
111. E.g. Lieberman, 566 N.Y.S.2d at 490; see also Stein v Stein, 707 N.Y.S.2d 754,
754 (Sup. Ct. 1999).
112. See, e.g., Moskowitz v. Moskowitz, N.Y. L.J., June 10, 1997, at 25 (denying
wife's motion to restrain husband from appearing before a beth din).
113. See Mr. S.W. v. Ms. T.W., N.Y. L.J., July 14, 1995 at 26 (denying motion to stay
wife from litigating in court without her first obtaining permission to litigate from
religious arbitrator).
114. Id. The threat of revoking a Jewish bill of divorce carries with it many serious
social consequences. A woman without a get (Jewish divorce) cannot remarry or even
date, regardless of a civil divorce. Id. If she has relations with another man while still
technically married to her Jewish husband, she commits adultery. Id. If she has chil-
dren by another man while still married, the products of that union are illegitimate
and have the status of mamzer (illegitimate child) and these children can only marry
other mamzerim (plural form). Id.
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not be confirmed." 5 Similarly, although child support is an arbitra-
ble issue, decisions of child support are subject to a court's supervi-
sory power to intervene. 1 6 For example, when a beth din awarded
joint-custody to parents who had a relationship characterized by
animosity, the court vacated the decision and gave custody to the
mother.117 In that case, the court also duly vacated the disposition
of the house to the non-custodial parent, so that the children would
have a proper place to live with the custodial parent."'
A court may also vacate an arbitration award on public policy
grounds if the award contains a clause that limits or deprives a
party of his or her constitutional right to seek redress or protection
under criminal or civil law." 9 For example, a clause that forbids
the participant from obtaining an order of protection, z° or one for-
bidding the reporting of information to Child Protection Services
without permission of the beth din would fall under this cate-
gory.' 2' "While the parties may elect to arbitrate their differences
in a religious tribunal, the tribunal cannot abrogate to itself exclu-
sive jurisdiction over all civil and criminal matters involving the
parties.' '1 22
Partial awards decided by the beth din ("partial psak din") may
also be unenforceable on public policy grounds. 123 If the underlying
dispute is arbitrable, however, the secular court in the case of a
partial ruling must remand the dispute to the beth din to fully de-
cide the dispute, because there is a valid arbitration agreement be-
tween the parties 4.12
Efforts to vacate beth din arbitration awards based on other pub-
lic policy grounds on the whole have been unsuccessful. 25 In fact,
in New York case a beth din arbitration case stands for the proposi-
tion that an attack on arbitrability premised on vagueness or over-
115. Rakoszynski v. Rakoszynski, 663 N.Y.S.2d 957, 958 (Sup. Ct. 1997) (citing Co-
hen v. Cohen, 600 N.Y.S.2d 996 (App. Div. 1993)); Glauber v. Glauber, 600 N.Y.S.2d
740 (App. Div. 1993)).
116. See Lieberman, 566 N.Y.S.2d at 495-96.
117. Id. at 494.
118. Id. at 495.
119. Rakoszynski, 663 N.Y.S.2d at 950-61.
120. Mr. S.W. v. Ms. T.W., N.Y. L.J., July 14, 1995 at 26 (noting that "efforts to
secure specific enforcement of an agreement to arbitrate for purposes of enjoining
proceedings relating to domestic violence is fundamentally flawed.").
121. Rakoszynski, 663 N.Y.S.2d at 961.
122. Id.
123. See, e.g., Lieber v. Diamanstein, N.Y.L.J., July 19, 2001 at 20.
124. Id.; see also N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 7511(d).
125. See, e.g., Meisels v. Uhr, 593 N.E.2d 1359 (N.Y. 1992); Holler v. Goldberg, 623
N.Y.S.2d 512, 512 (Sup. Ct. 1995).
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breadth of the initial agreement will usually fail, as this is not
against public policy.126
Ordinarily, when arbitration produces a decision that contradicts
the law of the state, the decision will be vacated on public policy
grounds. 27 The argument, however, that the decision of the beth
din is against public policy due to an infringement of secular law is
not always a means to vacate an arbitration award. 128 In one case,
a rabbi who was fired submitted to arbitration with the Board of
Directors of his synagogue regarding his termination, even though
according to the Religious Corporations Law, only synagogue
members may fire the rabbi.129 Thus, one must infer that a viola-
tion of the Religious Corporations Law is not considered a
"strong" enough statute to constitute a violation of public policy.130
B. Duress
An established principle of contract law states that a contract
entered into under duress is voidable by the victim.1 3 1 The test for
duress, according to the Restatement Second of Contracts, is
whether the threat leaves no reasonable alternative for the victim
but to sign the contract.1 32 Arbitration agreements are contracts
and must be interpreted under the accepted rules of contract
law.133 What is reasonable, in a Jewish context, is a challenge for
the courts to define due to the judges' limited experience and in-
sight into Jewish cultural norms.
New York leads the nation in awareness of issues pertinent to
Jewish divorce proceedings, as evidenced by the passage of the
"Get Statute' 1 34 and other rulings recognizing the powerful coer-
cive power a recalcitrant husband retains when he withholds a
126. Meisels, 593 N.E.2d at 1359 (approving arbitration clauses phrased in all-en-
compassing terms).
127. See Mineola Union Free Sch. Dist. v. Mineola Teachers Ass'n, 389 N.E.2d 111,
112 (N.Y 1979) ("Arbitration is foreclosed ... when it contravenes a strong public
policy, almost invariably involving an important constitutional or statutory duty or
responsibility").
128. Holler, 623 N.Y.S.2d at 513.
129. Id.
130. See Mineola Union Free Sch.l Dist., 389 N.E.2d at 112.
131. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 175 (1981).
132. Id.
133. Salvano v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, 647 N.E.2d 1298, 1302 (N.Y.
1995).
134. Act of Aug. 8, 1983, 1983 N.Y. Laws ch. 979 (codified at N.Y. Dom. Rel. Law
§ 253 (McKinney Supp. 1983)). This Act determined that a secular court may take
into consideration through equitable distribution a barrier to remarriage, an undis-
puted reference to the refusal of a husband to deliver a get. For example, this statute
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get.135 In New York, when a recalcitrant husband withholds a get in
order to gain from the threat in a divorce settlement in a beth din,
this behavior is legally recognized as duress.136 The New York
courts, however, have not yet recognized the power the beth din
itself can exert over a person to unwillingly submit to its authority.
A tool the beth din utilizes to exert its power is called a shtar
siruv (also spelled seruv), which is defined in the literature of the
Beth Din of America as "a document noting that this person ref-
uses to participate in the proceedings of the Beth Din of America,
and permitting, according to Jewish law, the claimant to seek relief
in secular court, ' 137 which may be publicized "in any manner the
beth din sees fit.' 38 This definition is deceptive. It sounds as if a
notice will be publicized in a newspaper as a legal notice, easily lost
in the fine print, which is the impact this type of publicity would
likely have in a secular context. In some communities, this may
hold true, but in Jewish communities that are close-knit and insu-
lated, a siruv is a formidable threat.139 A siruv can result in the
individual being shunned in the community that recognizes that
rabbinical court; in other words, it is a modern-day version of the
discontinued cherem, not simply a publication of refusal to submit
to a court proceeding. 140
In D. G. v. J. G.,' 41 the threat of a siruv was imposed in a pro-
ceeding involving, among other issues, the delivery of a get.142 Ms.
G.'s testimony revealed that she initially refused to sign the arbitra-
tion agreement because she was solely interested in procuring a get
from the process, and wanted to deal with the financial divorce is-
sues in a secular court proceeding that she had already com-
permits a court to grant a large amount of alimony on this factor alone. E.g,. Gindi v.
Gindi, N.Y. L.J., May 7, 2001, at 21.
135. Gindi, N.Y. L.J., May 7, 2001, at 21; see also Golding v. Golding, 581 N.Y.S.2d
4 (App. Div. 1992).
136. See Golding, 581 N.Y.S.2d at 7 (stating that forcing a wife to sign a beth din
arbitration agreement was invalid).
137. Recent Developments, supra note 54.
138. Id.
139. See Conference Revolutions, supra note 81, at 87, describing the pressure one
can feel in an isolated Jewish community as a result of proceedings in the beth din
(although not discussing siruv). One can be: "disinvited to weddings, asked not to
come to the synagogue, disinvited to all social gatherings. The essence of the orthodox
Jewish woman's life is her community and her friends. Generally there is no televi-
sion, no Internet, no magazines. She does not have access to the media as most other
people do. She is stuck. She has no way to get information." Id.
140. For a discussion of cherem, see supra note 31.
141. N.Y. L.J., Oct. 16, 1995 at 35.
142. Id.
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menced. 14 3 A letter was issued to her from the beth din that a siruv
would be set out against her if she did not withdraw the civil court
proceedings for spousal support. 144 Realistically speaking, if Ms.
G. wanted a get, she would not have cooperation from the beth din
if she ignored the siruv. By this vehicle, the beth din managed to
pressure her into entering binding arbitration without implicating
Mr. G. at all.145 If Mr. G. committed duress in forcing her to go to
the beth din by threatening to withhold a get, the arbitration agree-
ment would be invalid. 146 These actions by the beth din, however,
do not constitute duress.147 The disparate result is based on who
imposes the duress, here it was not the beth din itself, it was thus
demonstrating how the implementation of the law to this new area
can run counter to common sense notions of justice.
The fact that the courts are reluctant to label the threat of a siruv
as duress demonstrates a fundamental misunderstanding of what it
means to be an observant Jew, and the siruv's potentially tragic
effects on a person's social life, her livelihood, and that of her fam-
ily's. The court in Greenberg stated that the pressure from a siruv
to submit to the beth din only existed because it is a "manifestation
of her [the wife] having voluntarily undertaken obedience to the
religious law which such tribunals interpret and enforce. . . .an
enforcement mechanism by the religious law to which the peti-
tioner freely adheres, cannot be deemed duress.1 148 Therefore, ac-
cording to the law, if a religious body applies religious pressure on
an individual to do something, it is not duress because that individ-
ual can reasonably refuse and abstain from religious pressure to do
an act.1 4
9
When judged by the standard of "reasonableness" of the Re-
statement Second of Contracts, it does not seem reasonable that an
individual would choose to forgo signing a decree if it meant that
they will be cut off entirely from the only life they have ever known
in a tight-knit community. A siruv can have the effect of ruining
the very fabric of an individual's existence. If one is a member of a
very small sect of Judaism, defying the beth din can potentially re-
sult in the failure of one's business, the inability to have one's chil-
dren marry within the community, or the ability to participate in
143. Id.
144. Id.
145. Id.
146. See Golding v. Golding, 581 N.Y.S.2d 4 (App. Div. 1992).
147. Greenberg v. Greenberg, 656 N.Y.S.2d 369, 370 (App. Div. 1997).
148. Id.
149. See id.
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necessary communal activities. The legal system should measure
duress not by a secular yardstick, where the decision to be religious
is optional, but in the case of beth din decisions, measure the rea-
sonable person as an orthodox Jew who views religion as an un-
questionable necessity.
IV. THE TENSION BETWEEN THE SEPARATION OF CHURCH AND
STATE AND THE CONFIRMATION OF ARBITRATION
AWARDS PROCURED BY A
RELIGIOUS TRIBUNAL
Although beth din arbitration has been interacting with the New
York courts for several decades, there is still tension when a secular
court is called upon to vacate or enforce matters closely inter-
twined with religion. The Establishment Clause in the First
Amendment of the Constitution states, "Congress shall make no
law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free
exercise thereof. '' 150 The Court of Appeals articulated the basic
principle that allows for religious arbitration panels: while a court
cannot consider religious doctrine, it can determine disputes in-
volving religious aspects based upon "neutral principles of law."
151
Due to the tension in straddling the line between religion and the
secular courts, this principle has not been consistently applied.
152
The courts will strive to adjudicate the dispute by avoiding relig-
ious principles entirely, if at all possible.
153
The clash of secular and religious law is most prominent when an
injunction is sought under Civil Practice Law and Rules section
7502(c) which provides:
The supreme court in the county in which an arbitration is pend-
ing... may entertain an application.., for a preliminary injunc-
tion in connection with an arbitrable controversy, but only upon
the ground that the award to which the applicant may be enti-
150. U.S. CONST. amend. I. The First Amendment is applicable to the States
through the Fourteenth Amendment. See Presbyterian Church v. Mary Elizabeth
Blue Hull Mem'l Presbyterian Church, 393 U.S. 440, 441 (1969). For a thorough con-
stitutional analysis of the separation of church and state and the enforcement of relig-
ious agreements, see Laurence M. Warmflash, The New York Approach to Enforcing
Religious Marriage Contracts: From Avitzur To the Get Statute, 50 BROOK. L. REV.
229 (1984).
151. Avitzur v. Avitzur, 446 N.E.2d 136, 138 (N.Y. 1983).
152. See, e.g., Matthew Goldstein, Court Refuses to Halt Beth Din Rulings on Cus-
tody, N.Y.L.J., July 17, 1997, at 1.
153. See discussion infra and supra notes 150-160 and accompanying text.
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tied may be rendered ineffectual without such provisional
relief. 1
54
This arbitration statute is directly in conflict with the Free Exercise
Clause when applied in conjunction with a beth din. 55
A New York court has found an injunction against a beth din to
be an impermissible curtailment of religious freedom.156 A woman
who sought an injunction to stop custody proceedings in a beth din
was denied, in order to avoid the impermissible curtailment of a
religious tribunal. 157 The court denied her application, and instead
directed her to invalidate the proceeding after it is completed
under Civil Practice Law and Rules Article 75, thereby successfully
circumventing the issue of religious curtailment of the beth din.158
Instead of possibly violating the Free Exercise clause by imple-
menting New York law, the court directed other actions, which
would produce an identical result. 59 This demonstrates the unwill-
ingness of a secular court to control a beth din in the same way an
ordinary arbitration panel would. Not only will an injunction not
be imposed on the beth din itself, an individual may not be en-
joined from going to a beth din to avoid the curtailment of religious
freedom. 160
CONCLUSION
While establishing a forum for the creation of legally binding re-
ligious courts was likely a thought that would have never crossed
the minds of the Founding Fathers, the beth din thrives today as a
forum where unique, sometimes complex religious law is invited
into a legally binding decision-making process. The beth din has
always been, and will continue to be, a vital component of the Jew-
ish community. By incorporating itself into the American legal sys-
tem as an arbitration proceeding, the beth din will continue to play
an even greater role with the newfound enforceability of batei din
decisions.
While an impressive body of case law has developed to govern
the interaction between beth din arbitration and the secular courts,
there are still many improvements that need to be made in order
154. N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 7502(c) (McKinney 2003).
155. See Goldstein, supra note 152.
156. Id.
157. Id.
158. Id.
159. See id.
160. See Moskowitz v. Moskowitz, N.Y. L.J., June 10, 1997, at 25.
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for justice to be served by using this particular means of alternate
dispute resolution. Further preventative steps must be taken to en-
sure the decision reached through beth din arbitration are legally
valid. Requirements should be instated to require the arbitrator to
verbally confirm the right to counsel in a beth din, and include a
similar clause to that effect in the arbitration agreement.
The most urgent area in which reform is necessary is the recogni-
tion that a beth din is just as capable of exercising duress upon a
party as an individual party. The courts must begin to recognize
that duress comes in many forms, and among them is community
duress effected through a beth din. Actions formerly taken by a
beth din to enforce their decrees when the force of law was not
imbued in a beth din arbitration agreement, such as community
embarrassment or pressure, cannot be dismissed as irrelevant in an
action to vacate an agreement arising out of those manipulative
practices.
The secular courts must also become more comfortable with
broaching the barrier separating Church and State. The beth din
should not be accorded any greater or lesser privileges because
such issues involve religious aspects.
This is an area of law still in its infancy. While the law has made
great strides in some respects, in incorporating the beth din into the
secular legal system, the law still has to improve itself. Only with
the implementation of these improvements can the beth din truly
embody the dual secular and Biblical ideal: "Justice, justice thou
shall pursue! "161
161. Deuteronomy 48:20.
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